The Availability of Jury Trials in Copyright Infringement
Cases: Limiting the Scope of the Seventh Amendment
One of the objectives of the architects of modem pleading, 1 and an oft-expressed goal of legal scholars, 2 has been the elimination of the historical dichotomy between law and equity. The "merger" of the two ancient legal branches remains incomplete, 3 however, in large part because of the seventh amendment's mandate that "in suits at common law ... the right of trial by jury shall be preserved." 4 The amendment has been construed as providing the right to a jury trial in all civil cases considered to be "at law" at the time of the Constitution's adoption, but as denying this right in all cases considered "in equity" at that time. 5 Thus, the equitable/legal distinction retains great importance in civil cases in which the right to jury trial is at issue.
The problems of characterization and historical analysis involved in deciding whether a particular cause of action is legal or equitable are compounded when the legislature· creates new causes of action. Statutory remedies created after the adoption of the seventh amendment would seem to fall outside the amendment's stricture that the right to trial by jury shall be "preserved." However, the Supreme Court has held that a newly created statutory cause of action will carry with it the right to a jury trial if it can be properly characterized as "legal" in nature. 6 Thus, the question of whether a modem statutory cause of action entitles the parties to a jury trial often becomes one of whether the most closely analogous cause of action existing at the time of the Constitution's adoption in 1791 would have been char-acterized as "legal" or "equitable." 7 Cases brought pursuant to the federal copyright statute 8 present current examples of the characterization problem posed by newly created causes of action. Because it is frequently difficult for the plaintiff in a copyright case to prove the exact amount of his or her loss,9 the copyright statute gives the plaintiff the option of suing for "statutory" instead of "actual" damages. 10 Under the "statutory" damages provision, the plaintiff need not present any showing of actual loss; 11 the court is given authority to award as damages any amount it considers "just," between the limits of $250 and $10,000. 12 The copyright statute engenders little dispute when the plaintiff chooses to pursue actual damages, which are easily characterized as a legal remedy. 13 The statutory damages remedy, however, escapes such neat classification, for it combines elements characteristic of both legal and equitable remedies. 14 This Note addresses the question of whether the statutory damages remedy provided by the federal copyright statute is properly characterized as equitable or as legal, and consequently whether the remedy falls within the seventh amendment's jury trial provision. Courts 15 and commentators 16 disagree about the answers to these questions. Those who describe the statutory relief as "legal" point out that section 504( c) monetary damages are analogous to other forms of monetary relief, such as debt, which are legal in nature, 17 and that the 12. 17 U.S.C. § 504(c)(l) (1982) . Section 504(c)(2) raises the damages ceiling for willful infringement and lowers the damages floor for unknowing infringement.
13 [Vol. 83:1950 action's statutory predecessors have historically been considered legal. 18 Their opponents argue that the large amount of discretion allowed in fixing the level of damages 19 and the "calculation" of damages without regard to "facts" (the usual province of juries) indicate that the relief was intended to be and should be described as "equitable." 20 This Note argues that statutory copyright damages are properly regarded as equitable and hence that no right to a jury trial exists in cases brought to recover such damages. More generally, the Note maintains that the seventh amendment's distinction between equitable and legal causes of action has produced irrational consequences, and proposes that "legal" issues be defined narrowly so as to limit the scope of the seventh amendment. Part I analyzes the debate over statutory copyright damages, concluding that historical and statutory construction arguments require these damages to be construed as legal. Part II examines some of the problems that have resulted from traditional interpretations of the seventh amendment, and argues that these problems would be ameliorated by classifying ambiguous causes of action, such as statutory copyright damages, as equitable relief.
I. CHARACTERIZATION OF THE STATUTORY DAMAGES REMEDY: STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION AND HISTORICAL .ANALYSIS
In Gnossos Music v. Mitken, Inc., 21 the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit found that statutory damages under federal copyright law constituted legal damages, and thus that the defendant was within his rights in demanding a jury trial. 22 In so holding, the Fourth Circuit stands alone among the five circuits that have considered the issue. 23 The disagreement among the circuits extends to both issues 18 
A. Statutory Construction
Section 504(c) of the 1976 Copyrights Act, which provides for "statutory" relief, reads in pertinent part:
[T]he copyright owner may elect, at any time before final judgment is rendered, to recover, instead of actual damages and profits, an award of statutory damages . . . in a sum of not less than $250 or more than $10,000 as the court considers just. 25 Courts and commentators on both sides of the legal/ equitable debate have attempted to construe the language and intent of section 504(c) to their advantage. In the final analysis, however, the debate over statutory construction remains unresolved.
Several courts have focused on the use of the word "court" in section 504(c), concluding that Congress intended the issue of statutory relief to be tried before a judge. 26 In Gnossos, however, the Fourth Circuit found such reasoning unpersuasive. The Gnossos court cited a Supreme Court decision 27 in which a statutory remedy 28 directed by Congress to be administered by the "court" was nonetheless held legal in nature. 29 The Fourth Circuit thus concluded that the word "court" is a generic term that can denote either the judge or the jury. 30 The and accompanying text. The Palermo court reasoned simply that the remedy was not punitive, implying that its equitable character followed largely from that fact. 249 F.2d at 82.
24. In Gnossos, the Fourth Circuit found the evidence of congressional intent regarding the jury trial issue in § 504(c) cases to be inconclusive, but held that the seventh amendment provides a right to trial by jury. 653 F.2d at 119-21. The Ninth Circuit, on the other hand, relied on statutory construction in finding no right to jury trial, implicitly holding as well that the seventh amendment had no application to § 504(c) damages. (1976) . Since the award of actual damages has always been considered a legal remedy, Congress could not have meant to use the word "court" other than in its generic sense.
[Vol. 83:1950 Gnossos court ignored, however, the statute's use of the word "discretion" in addition to the phrase "as the court considers just." 31 Discretion is generally considered to be within the province of the judge, not the jury, 32 and the use of the word "discretion" in a statute has been held to be important in characterizing the statute as one providing equitable relief. 33 Thus, while the Gnossos court was probably correct in asserting that use of the word "court" is not indicative of Congressional intent, 34 it ignored the plausible argument that other wording in the statutory damages provision supports the view that Congress intended to provide for equitable relief. 35 A second area of dispute is whether Congress intended to alter the effect of prior copyright legislation. One commentator, William Patry, has traced the history of the various federal copyright statutes from the original copyright act of 1790 to the current statute. 36 Patry argues that since statutory copyright relief was demonstrably legal in nature in the nineteenth century, 37 and since subsequent enactments have left statutory damage provisions substantially unchanged, 38 one may infer that Congress intended such relief to be considered a legal 31. "As the court considers just" appears in 17 U.S.C. § 504(c)(l), and the word "discretion" is used with reference to the "court" in § 504(c)(2), the punitive damages provision. In addition, the legislative history of § 504(c)(l) indicates that Congress intended the "court" to "exercise discretion in awarding an amount within" the prescribed range of statutory damages. 43 The history offederal copyright legislation is therefore inconclusive. Patry further argues that since the statute allows plaintiffs to elect between actual and statutory damages at any time until judgment is rendered, the right to a jury trial, which undeniably exists in actions seeking actual damages, 44 must be afforded in suits for statutory damages as well. 45 Otherwise, he argues, the plaintiff would be forced to elect a remedy when he or she decides whether to demand a jury trial, a point in the proceedings well before trial. 46 [Vol. 83:1950 This late election is not impeded by the disparity in jury trial rights between statutory and actual relief. If the plaintiff has brought an action for actual damages, he may at the last minute change his mind and ask the judge for statutory relief. The judge would then be justified in taking the case away from the jury. 48 It is only the reverse decision (from statutory damages to actual damages) that is prematurely forced by the necessity of demanding a jury trial. 49 The copyright act does not guarantee the plaintiff the right to make this reverse election as late as immediately before judgment. so Patry's final statutory construction argument centers on the fact that section 504(c) establishes a separate set of damages, with a higher maximum, for willful copyright infringements.st Patry attacks the characterization of ordinary statutory damages as equitable, based on an assumption that such a characterization, once made, would necessarily apply to the willful infringement damages provision of section 504(c). Since the latter damages are clearly punitive, and since punitive damages have sometimes been regarded as legal, sz Patry takes issue with the characterization of the entire section as equitable.s 3 Aside from the possibility that the penal provisions may be applied separately from the other statutory damages, s 4 this argument is unpersuasive since other remedies, clearly penal in nature, have been held properly tried before a judge. ss Thus, statutory construction again 48 . Such a procedure is not "wasteful." Allowing a plaintiff to exercise a late choice between judge and jury will present situations where a jury, having been impaneled and after viewing the entire trial, is dismissed without ever being called upon to decide the case. But such a system would consume no more judicial resources than a full right to jury trial, which Congress surely could provide. Viewed from the point at which the plaintiff makes his or her decision, it does not matter whether the judge or jury ultimately decides the case. The outlay of resources is a fixed cost, and will be the same regardless of the plaintiff's choice.
49. If the plaintiff were allowed to change his mind at the last minute after presenting his claim for statutory relief to the judge, the defendant would be denied the opportunity to make a timely motion for jury trial.
50. Nothing in the statute implies that a plaintiff may elect actual damages "at any time before final judgment is rendered." See note 47 supra.
51. If the "court" finds that the infringement was willful the maximum allowable damage award increases to $50,000. 17 U.S.C. § 504(c) (2) fails to supply a definitive answer to the question whether federal copyright damages are properly considered legal or equitable, and therefore to whether a seventh amendment right to trial by jury exists in statutory damages cases.
B. Constitutional Analysis: The Historical Test
Regardless of whether Congress intended a remedy to be legal, the seventh amendment requires that a jury trial be made available to the parties if that remedy bears the indicia of legal relief. 56 In Ross v. Bernhard, 51 the Supreme Court enunciated the following three-part test for determining whether an issue should be characterized as "legal" or "equitable": 58 "[T]he 'legal' nature of an issue is determined by considering, first, the pre-merger custom with reference to such questions; second, the remedy sought; and, third, the practical abilities and limitations of juries." 59 59. 396 U.S. at 538 n.10. In Curtis v. Loether, 415 U.S. 189 (1974), the Court held that a new statutory cause of action falls within the scope of the seventh amendment "if the statute creates legal rights and remedies, enforceable in an action for damages in the ordinary courts of Jaw." 415 U.S. at 194. The Curtis court used "nature of the remedy" reasoning to conclude that title VIII cases are legal. The court did not mention or apply the other two parts of the Ross test, perhaps because the second part -nature of the remedy -was so clearly dispositive of the case.
In finding that section 504(c) damages were legal in nature, the Fourth Circuit in Gnossos Music v. Mitken, Inc., 653 F.2d 117 (4th Cir. 1981), applied its own unique formulation of the Curtis holding. This formulation, which had its genesis in Barber v. Kimbrell's, Inc., 577 F.2d 216 (4th Cir.), cert denied, 439 U.S. 934 (1978) , operated by dividing a cause of action into two components -the rights protected and the remedy granted -each to be examined separately and characterized as either legal or equitable. (In Gnossos the court concluded that both the rights and the remedy were legal.)
Aside from the fact that such a test is inconsistent with the Ross test, the split into "rights" and "remedies" adopted by the Fourth Circuit is as conclusory and unhelpful as attempts to characterize the case as a whole. (For examples of the latter difficulty see notes 75-80 infra and accompanying text.) Labelling an element of a cause of action a "right" or a "remedy" does little to advance the seventh amendment inquiry; what is needed is a method for determining if a right or a remedy is "legal." The Ross test, at least, provides a substantive answer to this question. 
Pre-merger Custom
The first inquiry in the three-prong Ross test is a historical one: whether prior to the merger of law and equity, the cause of action was considered to be legal or equitable. Unfortunately, this historical analysis fails to yield a definitive answer to the question of whether statutory copyright damages are properly characterized as legal or equitable. 62 Originally, the copyright remedy was one at common law. 63 This traditional remedy was supplemented in England in the seventeenth century by statutory copyright remedies, 64 and in America in the eighteenth century by state statutes. 65 These remedies, too, were apparently legal in nature. 66 The first federal copyright legislation was enacted in 1790, 67 and was amended periodically throughout the nineteenth century. 68 The original federal statute explicitly provided for relief to be granted in actions at law; 69 a subsequent act extended jurisdiction to federal equity courts over suits in which an injunction was sought. 70 None of the Anglo-American statutory copyright enactments prior Although Patry argues that the above statutes are essentially the same, careful inspection of the two acts demonstrates that only one damage provision is created by the pre-1909 law, whereas three separate provisions are established by the 1909 act: actual damages, profits, and "in lieu" damages. The "in lieu" clause has no counterpart in the pre-1909 act. Furthermore, Patry makes the unsupported statement that the phrase "as to the court shall appear to be just" in the 1909 act was intended to modify the entire section, including the provisions relating to actual damages and profits. Patry, supra note 16, at 176. Again, careful inspection of the act [Vol. 83:19S0 determine if the modern action is equitable or legal. 75 The Gnossos court, for example, analogized statutory copyright damages to two traditional common law actions: tortious interference with property rights and the common law action for debt. 76 The court's analogy to tort law is unhelpful. Copyright actions protect property interests, and therefore sound in tort, but this fact does not aid in determining whether statutory copyright actions are "legal." Tort actions -particularly property-interference tort actions -can be either legal or equitable, depending on the relief sought. 77 Indeed, the copyright statute is a good example of this phenomenon. If the relief sought in a copyright case is an injunction, the cause of action is equitable; 78 if actual damages or profits are sought, it is legal. 79 The important question is how to categorize the remedy of statutory relief; categorization of the right protected is not useful. 80 The analogy to an action for debt is more helpful -at least it characterizes the relief sought. The Supreme Court, however, has described the action for debt as lying "whenever a sum certain is due to the plaintiff, or a sum which can readily be reduced to a certainty . . . . " 81 But statutory damages are completely unlike a "sum certain" -they are determined entirely at the discretion of the court, within prescribed limits. 82 Thus, the action for debt is distinguishable from an action for statutory damages for precisely the reason that most strongly characterizes the latter as an equitable action -its highly discretionary nature. 8 3 Since statutory damages did not exist prior to the twentieth century, and since no traditional form of relief is directly analogous to such damages, 84 the pre-merger history of copyright damages is inconclusive as to whether statutory damages should be regarded as legal or defeats Patry's contentions. The phrase "as to the court shall appear to be just" is intended to modify only "such damages" as may be awarded in lieu of actual damages and profits.
Patry's statutory construction arguments are thus unpersuasive. The 1909 act's "in lieu" damages did not represent a reenactment of traditional legal copyright relief, but rather a wholly novel discretionary remedy.
1S. See 
Nature of the Remedy
The second prong of the Ross test inquires whether the remedy sought is fundamentally equitable or legal in nature. 86 This inquiry presupposes, of course, that specific factors can be identified as "fundamentally" characteristic of equitable or legal remedies. Although the validity of this assumption is disputed, 87 courts have adopted generalizations that purport to identify the primary characteristics of equitable and legal relief. 88 In the context of statutory damages, the two most important characterizations are the general associations of monetary relief with legal jurisdiction, 89 and of "discretionary" relief with equitable jurisdiction. 90 An analysis of these factors leads to the conclusion that statutory copyright damages are best characterized as equitable.
The strongest factor weighing in favor of characterizing statutory copyright damages as "legal" is that they provide for monetary relief. Money damages have generally been associated with legal jurisdiction, 91 unlike specific performance, which has typically been associ- 
See, e.g .• 2 J. AUSTIN, LECTURES ON JURISPRUDENCE 639 (London 1869) ("It is impos-
sible to give any idea of [English equity], in general or abstract expressions . . . . In order to explain to a foreigner the nature of English equity, it would be necessary to enumerate all the cases in which the Chancellor had interposed to supply or correct the defects of the law administered by the Common Law Courts. The notion that there is any essential or necessary distinction is the merest absurdity.").
88. See notes 102-07 infra and accompanying text .. 89. See note 91 infra and accompanying text. 90. See note 32 supra. The objection might be raised that associating "discretion" with equity jurisdiction is as formalistic a distinction as that between equity and law, a distinction criticized elsewhere in this Note. See notes 123-35 infra and accompanying text. That is, juries necessarily exercise great discretion in inferring "facts" from evidence and in other areas, and judges in practice apply their own versions of facts in making necessary determinations from the bench.
Nevertheless, jurors were historically thought of as deciding rigidly defined issues of fact, which would then be "plugged into" legal formulae explained by the judge. Patry rejects the analogy between statutory damages and the backpay provisions of title VII. Patty, supra note 16, at 189. He distinguishes the two forms of relief on the grounds that (1) unlike copyright claims, claims of racial discrimination under title VII can often evoke racial prejudice among jurors; and (2) unlike backpay, "statutory copyright damages are not in the nature of restitution" because they are imprecise. Id.
Patry's first point of differentiation is well taken. It is likely that courts holding title VII cases to be equitable have been influenced by the risk of racial prejudice among potential jurors. Patry fails to show, however, why statutory copyright damages and backpay are not both "restitutionary." The mere fact that § 504(c) damages are not a precise measure of a plaintifrs loss does not mean that they are not restitutionary. The very purpose of such relief is to provide restoration of a plaintiffs loss when the actual loss is difficult to prove. See note 96 supra. Backpay damages may be more precise than § 504(c) damages, but precision is not a necessary element of "restitution." equitable. 98 More important, traditional legal damages were either tied to a specific factual loss (the "facts" to be determined by the jury) or were punitive in nature. 99 Statutory copyright damages are not punitive unless brought under the provisions of section 504( d). 100 Moreover, they are not tied to any factual loss, but rather depend solely on the court's determination of a ''just" level of damages within the statutory limits. 101 This degree of discretion is an element foreign to actions at law, 102 and is one of the features seized on by both courts and commentators as especially characteristic of equity jurisdiction. 103 Several courts, labelling particular forms of statutory relief as equitable, have based their decisions in large part on the appearance of the word "discretion" in the statute. 104 To be sure, some commentators have argued against associating discretion solely with equity jurisdiction, asserting that law judges were also historically invested with a certain amount of discretion. 105 As a general proposition, however, "discretion" is certainly more closely associated with equity than with law. 106 Further, it appears settled that discretion is an appropriate factor to be taken into account in characterizing a cause of action for purposes of the seventh amendment. 107 [Vol. 83:1950 The 1974 Supreme Court holding in Curtis v. Loether 108 lends support to the foregoing analysis. Curtis involved a plaintiff's suit for ·damages and injunctive relief pursuant to Title VIII (the Fair Housing provision) of the Civil Rights Act of 1968. 109 The Court held that the damages sought, described by the plaintiff as actual and punitive, were "legal" in nature and hence within the purview of the seventh amendment.110 However, Justice Marshall, writing for the majority, carefully distinguished the plaintiff's cause of action from title VII suits for job reinstatement and backpay, which lower courts had consistently held to be equitable.1 11 Not all monetary statutory relief was "legal," he noted. Title VII backpay was restitutionary in nature, and the authorizing statutory language ("as the court deems appropriate") invested the factfinder with greater discretion than did title VIII provisions. 112 Section 5O4(c) copyright relief, like title VII relief, has been characterized as "restitutionary" in nature. 113 In addition, the copyright statute invests the fact-finder with great discretion in determining section 5O4(c) damages. 114 Applying the reasoning of Curtis v. Loether, statutory copyright damages are analogous to title VII backpay damages.115 Characterization of statutory damages as "equitable" is therefore entirely consistent with Curtis, and is the correct result under the second prong of the Ross test.
Abilities of Juries
The third prong of the Ross test concerns the "abilities and limitations of juries." 116 Under this leg of the test, a cause of action is more likely to be considered equitable if it typically raises issues too complex for the average juror to comprehend and decide fairly.1 17
This final leg of the Ross test does not aid in determining whether statutory copyright damages are properly considered legal or equitable. Admittedly, the issues involved in determining whether an infringement has occurred and what damages are appropriate are not (holding case to be "legal" since, inter alia, issues were not overly complicated for jury). See also Redish, supra note 7, at 523-25, concerning the impact of the third prong.
generally of a prohibitively complex nature, 118 suggesting that copyright damages should always be regarded as legal. However, the third prong of the Ross test, as it has been applied, works in only one direction. That is, if a case is too complex for a jury, it is considered equitable; but if it is within the grasp of a jury, it is considered also to be within the grasp of a judge, and the test is inconclusive. 119
On the other hand, even if statutory copyright issues were very complicated, the same issues would be raised in suits for actual damages, which have always been considered legal. 120 Therefore, the complexity factor cannot operate to make statutory damages equitable, without operating to make all copyright damages equitable. The third prong of the Ross test has not received a sufficiently positive response by lower courts to justify a change in the accepted characterization of actual damages. 121 This prong of the Ross test is thus not helpful in determining whether issues within the competence of both judge and jury should be characterized as legal or equitable, and is therefore not determinative in the context of statutory copyright damages.
In sum, neither the first nor the third element of the Ross inquiry answers the question of whether statutory damages are legal or equitable.122 Therefore, the second element of the test -the nature of the remedy -is determinative. Statutory damages are highly discretionary and do not bear any necessary relationship to factual loss. These characteristics are more consistent with equitable than with legal jurisdiction and suggest that statutory damages are best characterized as equitable. Accordingly, no right to a jury trial should exist in cases brought to recover statutory copyright damages. . 1977 ). This analysis is to be distinguished from a second test, used when the remedy is clearly legal. In such a case, if the issues are not overly complex, the jury will try the case (since the remedy is a legal one). The present discussion seeks to identify the statutory cause of actlon as legal or equitable, a different inquiry. [Vol. 83:1950 
II. POLICY CONSIDERATIONS FOR LIMITING THE SEVENTH AMENDMENT'S SCOPE
The problem of characterizing section 504(c) damages is merely one example of the difficulties faced by federal courts under the prevailing interpretation of the seventh amendment. 123 Related problems of allocating jury trials and classifying causes of action have led many observers to decry the antiquated practice of granting the right to jury trial only in cases that would have been characterized as "legal" in 1791. 124 Due to the clear language of the seventh amendment, the historical approach is largely unavoidable. 125 Courts retain greater latitude, however, in classifying new causes of action such as section 504( c) damages. When confronted with causes of action that did not exist in 1791, courts may define "law" narrowly, and "equity" broadly, without doing violence to either the Constitution or settled Supreme Court doctrine. 126 Such an approach would minimize the number of cases in which the seventh amendment mandates an absolute right to a jury trial, and maximize the number of cases in which rational, utilitarian decisions could be made about whether to provide a jury trial.
That the seventh amendment produces interpretative problems and leads to an irrational allocation of the right to jury trials has been widely recognized. 127 Were it not for the seventh amendment, the antiquated distinction between law and equity would have greatly declined in significance. 128 Today, the most important reason for the continued existence of an equity /law distinction is the allocation of jury trials. Unfortunately, cases are assigned the "legal" or "equitable" label for reasons wholly unrelated to the jury question.
As the situation now stands, a party's right to a jury trial in a civil case depends upon whether the cause of action would have been characterized as "legal" or "equitable" in 1791. Perhaps the most dis- STAS0N , supra note 1, at 90. The distinction remains in two other areas of the law. First, the right to "equitable" relief (an injunction) is still based on the inadequacy of "legal" relief (money damages). Second, the scope of appellate review is still affected by whether the issue is legal or equitable. Id.
turbing aspect of this method of allocating jury trials is that, historically, the suitability of a case for jury trial was not an important factor in determining whether an emerging cause of action fell within equitable or legal jurisdiction. 129 As Professor James has noted, whether a case came to be equitable rather than legal frequently had more to do with the evidentiary, procedural, or relief-granting capabilities of equity than with the appropriateness of the case for judicial determination. 130 In some instances, equity's jurisdiction over a case depended simply on the Chancellor's political influence at a particular time. 131 Even if it were rational to allocate civil jury trials according to whether a case was historically "legal" or "equitable," deciding into which category a case fits is difficult. 132 Authorities have remarked on more than one occasion that "equity" is impossible to define descriptively .133 An attempt to categorize a case according to whether its closest 1791 analogue was considered equitable or legal may prove equally fruitless, since no guidelines for choosing the "closest" analogue are satisfactory. As the discussion of section 5O4(c) damages suggests, the "closest" analogue may be equitable or legal, depending on whether it is chosen according to the type of right being protected, the type of relief being provided, or any number of other factors. 134 The seventh amendment as it is now interpreted thus perpetuates an irrational and unworkable system for allocating jury trials. 135 129. James, supra note 124, at 661 ("At no time in history was the line dividing equity from law altogether -or even largely -the product of a rational choice between issues which were better suited to court or to jury trial.").
130. James, supra note 124, at 661-63. One English writer has expressed dismay at how the historic dichotomy is used in America: "There seemed to me to be something surprisingly obsolete about deciding upon the mode of trial, not as the Supreme Court had hinted in 1970 by reference to 'the practical abilities and limitations of juries' but by reference to a line reached in another country ... nearly two centuries before." Devlin, supra note 124, at 1575. Lord Devlin has urged that some of the more unfortunate consequences of the seventh amendment can be avoided by applying the doctrine, known to English equity in 1791, that even clearly legal cases are to be tried in equity if the case is too complex for a jury to comprehend. Id. at 1599-605. 459-63 (1922) , quoted in E. STASON, supra note 1, at 77-81 (relating the highlights of the long-running struggle between the Chancellor and the King's Bench).
w. HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW
132. James, supra note 124, at 668 ("[H]istory is sometimes equivocal."). See also note 87 supra.
The words of Professor Maitland are particularly apt:
[W]e are driven to say that Equity now is that body of rules administered by our English courts of justice which, were it not for the operation of the Judicature Acts, would be administered only by those courts which would be known as Courts of Equity.
This, you may well say, is but a poor thing to call a definition.
• . . Still I fear that nothing better than this is possible. The constitutional mandate that "the right of trial by jury shall be preserved" 136 requires a principled allocation of that right to new causes of action, not a rigid historical inquiry. To that end, this Note proposes a straightforward solution that should prove effective: courts should interpret "equity" more broadly when defining newly created statutory causes of action. When a new statutory cause of action is neither clearly legal nor clearly equitable, and no pre-1791 analogy seems determinative, that cause of action should be regarded as equitable. Such a policy would limit the cases in which the seventh amendment requires a jury trial, thus leaving more cases free for legislative determination of the appropriateness of jury trial. 137 This approach does not do violence to the constitutional guarantee of the right to a jury trial in civil cases. 138 A broadened definition of equity would affect only those few causes of action that have been newly created by Congress, and that seem ~o fit neither the "legal" nor the "equitable" definition. The historical argument that the framers "intended" to guarantee the right to a jury trial is weakest in a case of this type. A broad judicial definition of equity would simply allow supra note 7, at 517 (proposal to interpret seventh amendment strictly); CHICAGO Comment, supra note 105, at 365 (proposal to take the abilities of juries into account to a greater extent), Perhaps the most striking suggestion was Professor Redish's proposal to interpret the seventh amendment quite narrowly: "One possible means of employing the historical approach to achieve much the same flexibility would be to reject all forms of the rational approach .
•.
• [A] rigid historical approach would • . . dictate that, unless the actual substantive cause of action existed in 1791, the seventh amendment does not guarantee a right to jury trial.").
136. U.S. CONST. amend. VII. 137. The seventh amendment only "preserves" the right to jury trial in legal cases. Since the amendment makes no provision for cases not considered legal, Congress is free to decide whether or not to provide jury trials in such cases. Thus, defining "equity" broadly increases the number of actions for which Congress may decide the appropriateness of providing a jury trial, and decreases the number of actions in which a right to jury trial is rigidly required by the Constitution. · The legislature could make the jury trial requirement in a given type of case depend upon, for example, the nature and complexity of the issues to be decided, whether a need exists for uniform case-by-case results, and whether the remedy is to be applied so as to fit consistently within a broader legislative scheme. Professor Redish has made a similar, albeit more extreme proposal.
See note 135 supra.
138. Robert Patry, in his discussion of copyright damages, has expressed concern over suggestions that the scope of the seventh amendment be narrowed:
The right to a jury is one of our most cherished rights. It cannot be denied on the grounds of expediency, or on the ground that judges are allegedly more flexible or just than juries. The reasons our forefathers fought for the right to a jury are as valid today as they ever were.
Patry, supra note 16, at 194.
It appears, however, that the institution of civil jury trial is not considered quite the prized tradition it once was. Attacks on the efficacy and fairness of the civil jury have been heard from several quarters in the last half-century. The most famous of these attacks was unleashed by Judge Frank, who complained that "a better instrument than the usual jury trial could scarcely be imagined for achieving uncertainty, capriciousness, lack of uniformity, disregard of the Congress to allocate jury trials on a more rational basis than does the present equitable/legal distinction. 139 The proposed approach is also not inconsistent with established Supreme Court policy. At first glance, a restrictive interpretation of the seventh amendment would appear to run counter to the Supreme 143 However, these three cases dealt not with the characterization of a new cause of action as equitable or legal, but with the jury trial consequences when recognizable equitable and legal issues were presented in the same case. 144 The very most that can be said for the applicability of these cases to the characterization of new causes of action is that they reflect a general bias on the Court's part in favor of expanding the seventh amendment's scope. Such an interpre- 144. In Beacon Theatres, the plaintiff sought an injunction to prevent the defendant's filing of an antitrust claim. The defendant responded by counterclaiming with an antitrust count. 359 U.S. at 502-03. The Court held that the legal claim (the antitrust count) had to be tried to the jury before the equitable claim (the injunction) could be decided by the judge. Otherwise, reasoned the Court, the judge's ruling on the injunction might bar the defendant's antitrust claim by resjudicata, thereby depriving defendant of his right to a jury trial on that claim. 359 U.S. at 507-08. Beacon Theatres is directly applicable, therefore, only to the issue of deciding the order of trial when recognizable equitable and legal claims are found in the same action. It does not speak to the issue of defining a new cause of action as "equitable" or "legal."
The same may be said for Dairy Queen, decided three years later. The plaintiff corporation in that case had sought a judgment for money damages, but had characterized its plea as one for an "accounting." The Court held that this characterization did not alter the legal nature of the claim. 369 U.S. at 477-78. The Court also ruled that the defendant retained its right to have legal issues tried to a jury despite the lower court's characterization of those issues as "incidental" to equitable ones present in the same case. 369 U.S. at 473.
In Ross, the Court held that a shareholders' derivative suit carried the right to a jury trial in certain instances. 396 U.S. at 539. Though shareholders' derivative suits had traditionally been considered equitable, the Court reasoned that with the advent of the Federal Rules, these cases could be divided into two subdivisions: (1) the stockholders' right to sue on behalf of the corporation, and (2) the corporation's claim against the defendants. The Court held that in those cases in which the latter claim could properly be described as "legal" the parties would be entitled to trial by jury. 396 U.S. at 539.
The dissenting opinion in Ross argued that the majority was not truly determining the disposition of two separate causes of action, but rather redefining one general cause of action: the shareholders' derivative suit. 396 U.S. at 549 (Stewart, J., dissenting). If this description of the majority's reasoning were accurate, the case would stand as authority for defining "legal" causes of action broadly. But the majority in Ross saw itself as allocating the factfinding function between several distinct causes of action. 396 U.S. at 539.
Therefore Ross, like Beacon Theatres and Dairy Queen, is not applicable to the classification of a new cause of action such as the statutory copyright remedy. The latter problem, in fact, is fundamentally different from that presented in those three cases. The question of whether a single new cause of action is equitable or legal cannot be resolved simply by splitting the case up. This question, rather, involves a determination of how to categorize one issue that may possess both equitable and legal characteristics.
[Vol. 83:1950 tation would, however, read too much into the Court's opinions. 145 As various other Supreme Court opinions illustrate, the Court has been willing to narrow the scope of the seventh amendment in appropriate situations. 146 Moreover, even if a pro-jury bias has colored the Court's decisions in cases involving both legal and equitable issues, that bias would not necessarily extend to the separate issue of classifying new causes of action. In this limited area -categorization of new causes of action -the Court has been all but silent. 147 Thus, a policy of defining "equity" broadly in such cases would violate no settled constitutional interpretation. Indeed, such a policy would lend coherence to seventh amendment doctrine by ameliorating some of the problems caused by the perpetuation of the antiquated equitable/legal distinction.
CONCLUSION
Parties in dispute over whether statutory copyright damages are legal or equitable have burdened the federal courts with numerous cases and many appeals. 148 As in other instances of litigation engendered by the seventh amendment, however, the underlying issue is not really whether the cases are legal or equitable, but whether the parties have the right to a jury trial.
The available evidence indicates that the statutory copyright damages remedy is properly considered equitable. But even if this result were not so clear, a policy of defining this and other ambiguous causes of action as equitable would help reduce the irrelevant arguments, and the irrational results, produced by an unduly broad interpretation of the seventh amendment.
-Andrew W. Stumpff 145. The Court has not argued from the premise that the seventh amendment is to be interpreted broadly. Rather, in these cases the Court has found that procedural barriers that had prevented application of the amendment have been removed by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The Court has not extended the definition of what cases are to be called "legal," but instead has merely recognized the rules' potential for separating concededly legal claims from concededly equitable ones. 
